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ABSTRACT
We introduce a general learning framework for private machine learning based on
randomised response. Our assumption is that all actors are potentially adversarial
and as such we trust only to release a single noisy version of an individual’s
datapoint. Our approach forms a consistent way to estimate the true underlying
machine learning model and we demonstrate this in the case of logistic regression.
1 PRIVATE MACHINE LEARNING
Our desire is to develop a strategy for machine learning driven by the requirement that private data
should be shared as little as possible and that no-one can be trusted with an individual’s data, neither
a data collector/aggregator, nor the machine learner that tries to fit a model.
Randomised Response, see for example Warner (1965), is relevant in this context in which a datapoint
xn is replaced with a randomised ‘noisy’ version x˜n. A classical example is voting in an election in
which an individual voter votes for one of two candidates A or B and is asked to lie (with probability
p) about whom they voted for . This results in noisy data and estimating the fraction fA of voters that
voted for candidate A based on this noisy data
f˜A =
1
N
N∑
n=1
I (x˜n = A) (1)
can give a potentially significantly incorrect estimate. As Warner (1965) showed, since we know
the probabilistic mechanism that generated the noisy data, a better estimate of the fraction of voters
voting for candidate A is given by
fA =
f˜A + p
1− 2p (2)
In a machine learning context, the kind of scenario we envisage is that users may have labelled face
images as “happy" or “sad" on their mobile phones and the company MugTome wishes to train a
“happy/sad" face classifier; however, users do not wish to send the raw face images to MugTome and
also wish to be able to plausibly deny which label they gave any training image. To preserve privacy,
each user will send to MugTome only a single corrupted datapoint — a single corrupted image and a
single corrupted label.
It is straightforward to extend our approach to deal with users sending multiple corrupted datapoints.
However, since MugTome will potentially then know which corrupted datapoints belong to each user,
they will have more information to help reveal the underlying clean datapoint. Since we assume we
cannot trust MugTome, MugTome may attempt to recover the underlying true datapoint. For example,
if a user sends three class labels c1, c2, c3, ci ∈ {0, 1}, then MugTome can have a good guess of the
underlying true class label by simple taking the majority class c = I (c1 + c2 + c3 > 2). Indeed, in
general, if M corrupted datapoints are independently generated for a user, then MugTome’s ability
to reveal the true class (or attribute) increases dramatically. For example, if MugTome know the
corruption mechanism p(cm|ctrue) the posterior of the class is given by
p(ctrue|c1, . . . , cM ) ∝ p(ctrue)
M∏
m=1
p(cm|ctrue) (3)
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where p(ctrue) is the prior belief on the true class. This posterior distribution concentrates exponen-
tially quickly (in M ) around the true value ctrue. Similarly, if a pollster asks each voter three times
what they voted, then the questioner would have a very good idea of the true vote of each voter; to
protect the voter’s privacy, the voter would then have to trust that the pollster either does not pass on
any information that states that the three votes came from the same person or that the pollster doesn’t
attempt themselves to figure out what the voter voted for.
Similarly, in a medical setting in which a patient privately owns a datapoint, releasing M synthetic
versions (corruptions) of that datapoint can compromise privacy if which synthetic datapoints belong
to each person is also known. To guarantee that privacy is retained would require patients to trust
people with their data, namely that any data aggregation process will remove their patient ID. However,
this is something out of the control of the patient and as such we do not consider generating multiple
synthetic datapoints (see for example Bindschaedler et al. (2017)) a ‘safe’ mechanism.
For these reasons, we wish to make a process in which an individual only reveals a single corrupted
datapoint; from that point onwards in the machine learning training process, no other trust in that
process is required. To motivate our general approach to private machine learning we discuss the
voting example in more detail in section(3). Connections to other forms of privacy preserving machine
learning are discussed in section(7). The justification for our approach hinges on the properties of the
Spread Divergence, which we review in the following section.
2 SPREAD DIVERGENCE
Throughout we use the notation p(X = x) for a random variable X in state x. However, to reduce
notational overhead, where unambiguous, we write simply p(x).
A divergence D(p||q) (see, for example Dragomir (2005)) is a measure of the difference between two
distributions p and q with the property
D(p||q) ≥ 0 and D(p||q) = 0 ⇔ p = q (4)
An important class is the f -divergence, defined as
Df (p||q) = Eq(x)
[
f
(
p(x)
q(x)
)]
(5)
where f(x) is a convex function with f(1) = 0. A special case of an f -divergence is the well-known
Kullback-Leibler divergence KL(p||q) = Ep(x)
[
log p(x)q(x)
]
which is widely used to train models using
maximum likelihood. For the Spread Divergence, from q(x) and p(x) we define new distributions
q˜(x˜) and p˜(x˜) that have the same support. Using the notation
∫
x
to denote integration
∫
(·) dx for
continuous x, and
∑
x∈X for discrete x with domain X , we define a random variable x˜ with the same
domain as x and distributions
p˜(x˜) =
∫
x
p(x˜|x)p(x), q˜(x˜) =
∫
x
p(x˜|x)q(x) (6)
where p(x˜|x) ‘spreads’ the mass of p and q such that p˜(x˜) and q˜(x˜) have the same support. For
example, if we use a Gaussian p(x˜|x) = N (x˜ x, σ2), then p˜ and q˜ both have support R. The spread
divergence has a requirement on the noise p(x˜|x), namely that D(p˜||q˜) = 0 ⇔ p = q; that is, if
the divergence of the spreaded distributions is zero, then the original non-spreaded distribution will
match. As shown in Zhang et al. (2018) this is guaranteed for certain ‘spread noise’ distributions.
In particular, for continuous x and x˜ of the same dimension and injective function f , a sufficient
condition for a valid spread noise p(x˜|x) = K(x˜− f(x)) is that the kernel K(x) has strictly positive
Fourier Transform. For discrete variables, a sufficient condition is that p(x˜ = i|x = j) = Pij is that
Pij > 0 and the matrix P is square and invertible.
Spread divergences have a natural connection to privacy preservation and Randomised Response
(Warner, 1965). The spread divergence suggests a general strategy to perform private machine
learning. We first express the machine learning problem as minθ Df (p(X)||pθ(X)) for a specified
model pθ(X). Then, given only noisy data X˜ , we fit the model by minθ Df
(
p˜(X˜)||p˜θ(X˜)
)
. To
explain in more detail how this works, we first describe randomised response in a classical voting
context and then justify how to generalise this to principled training of machine learning models
based on corrupted data.
2
3 A CLASSICAL VOTING EXAMPLE
There are two candidates in an election, candidate “one" and candidate “zero" and Alice would like
to know the fraction of voters that voted for candidate “one". We write the dataset of voting as a
collection of binary values {x1, . . . , xN}, xn ∈ {0, 1}.
3.1 LEARNING θ USING CLEAN DATA
If we assume that Alice has full knowledge of which candidate each voter voted for, then clearly
Alice may simply count the fraction of people that voted for “one” and set
θ =
1
N
N∑
n=1
xn (7)
It will be useful to first consider how to arrive at the same result from a modelling perspective. We
can consider an independent Bernoulli model
pθ(X1 = x1, . . . , XN = xN ) =
N∏
n=1
pθ(Xn = xn) (8)
where
pθ(X = 1) = θ (9)
so that
pθ(X = x) = θ
x (1− θ)1−x (10)
We also construct an empirical data distribution that places mass only on the observed joint state,
namely
pˆ(X1, . . . , XN ) =
N∏
n=1
δ(Xn, xn) (11)
where δ(x, x′) is the Kronecker delta function. Then
1
N
KL(pˆ(X1, . . . , XN )||pθ(X1, . . . , XN )) = LN (θ) + const. (12)
where
LN (θ) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
log pθ(Xn = xn) (13)
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
(xn log θ + (1− xn) log (1− θ)) (14)
and minimising KL(pˆ||pθ) (or maximising LN (θ)) with respect to θ recovers the fraction of votes
that are 1, equation(7). This shows how we can frame estimating the quantity θ from uncorrupted
private data as a divergence minimisation problem.
3.2 LEARNING θ USING CORRUPTED DATA
Returning to the privacy setting, Bob would also like to know the fraction of votes that are 1. However,
Alice does not want to send to Bob the raw data x1, . . . , xN since the votes of any individual should
not be explicitly revealed. To preserve privacy, Alice sends noisy data x˜1, . . . , x˜N to Bob. In this
case we draw a single joint sample x˜1, . . . , x˜N from the distribution
p(X˜1, . . . , X˜N |X1, . . . , XN ) =
N∏
n=1
p(X˜n|Xn) (15)
3
where the ‘spread noise’ model is p(X˜n = i|Xn = j) = Pij . Hence, if xn = 0 Alice draws a sample
x˜n = 0 with probability P00 and x˜n = 1 with probability P10.
Given a sampled noisy dataset x˜1, . . . , x˜N we form an empirical spreaded data distribution
pˆ(X˜1, . . . , X˜N ) =
N∏
n=1
δ
(
X˜n, x˜n
)
(16)
Similarly, the corrupted joint model is given by
p˜θ(X˜1, . . . , X˜N ) =
N∏
n=1
p˜θ(X˜n) (17)
where
p˜θ(X˜ = j) =
∑
j∈{0,1}
p(X˜ = j|X = j)pθ(X = j) (18)
On receiving the noisy dataset x˜1, . . . , x˜N , Bob can try to estimate θ by minimising
1
N
KL
(
pˆ(X˜1, . . . , X˜N )||pθ(X˜1, . . . , X˜N )
)
= − 1
N
N∑
n=1
log p˜θ(x˜n) + const. (19)
with respect to θ. Equivalently, he may maximise the scaled spread log likelihood
L˜N (θ) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
log p˜θ(x˜n) (20)
For this simple model, Bob can easily explicitly calculate
p˜θ(x˜ = 1) = p(x˜ = 1|x = 1)pθ(x = 1)+p(x˜ = 1|x = 0)pθ(x = 0) = P11θ+P10 (1− θ) (21)
Similarly, p˜θ(x˜ = 0) = P01θ + P00 (1− θ). In this case, equation(20) becomes
f˜0 log (P00 (1− θ) + P01θ) + f˜1 log (P10 (1− θ) + P11θ) (22)
where
f˜1 =
1
N
N∑
n=1
x˜n (23)
Using f˜0 + f˜1 = 1, P00 + P10 = 1, P01 + P11 = 1, the maximum of the spread log likelihood is at
θ =
f˜1 + P10
1− P10 − P01 (24)
which forms Bob’s estimate of the underlying fraction of voters that voted for candidate “one”.
For example, if there were no noise P10 = P01 = 0, Bob would estimate θ = f˜1, simply recovering
the fraction of votes that are 1 in the original data. In the limit of a large number of votes N →∞
and true probability θ0 of a voter voting for candidate “one”, then f˜0 tends to P00(1− θ0) + P01θ0
and Bob’s estimate recovers the true underlying voting probability θ = θ0. Hence, even though Bob
only receives a corrupted set of votes, in the limit of a large number of votes, he can nevertheless
estimate the true fraction of people that voted for candidate “one”.
4 PRIVATE MACHINE LEARNING USING RANDOMISED RESPONSE
The above example suggests a general strategy to perform private machine learning:
1. Phrase problem as likelihood maximisation: We first assume that a machine learning task
for private data x1, . . . , xN can be expressed as learning a data model pθ(X) by optimising
an objective
LN (θ) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
log pθ(Xn = xn) (25)
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2. Form a corrupted dataset: Draw a single joint sample x˜1, . . . , x˜N from the distribution
p(X˜1, . . . , X˜N |X1, . . . , XN ) =
N∏
n=1
p(X˜n|Xn) (26)
where p(X˜|X) is a defined spread noise distribution and known by both the owner of the
private data and the receiver of the corrupted data. To do this, we go through each element
of the dataset xn and replace it with a corruption x˜n sampled from p(X˜n = x˜n|Xn = xn).
3. Send data to learner: We then send to the learner the corrupted dataset x˜1, . . . , x˜N , the
model to be learned pθ(X) and the corruption probability p(X˜|X).
4. Estimate θ from corrupted data: Having received the corrupted data x˜1, . . . , x˜N , the learner
fits θ by maximising the objective
L˜N (θ) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
log p˜θ(x˜n) (27)
where
p˜θ(x˜) =
∫
x
p(x˜|x)pθ(x) (28)
4.1 JUSTIFICATION
If we assume that each element xn of the training data x1, . . . , xN is identically and independently
sampled from a model pθ0(Xn = xn), then each corrupted observation x˜n is a sample from the same
distribution given by
p˜θ0(X˜N = yn) =
∫
x
p(X˜n = yn|X = x)pθ0(X = x) (29)
By the law of large numbers the objective equation(27) approaches its average over the data generating
mechanism
lim
N→∞
LN (θ)
a.s.−−→
∫
x˜
p˜θ0(X˜ = x˜) log p˜θ(X˜ = x˜) (30)
and maximising the spread likelihood objective L˜N (θ) becomes equivalent to minimising
KL
(
p˜θ0(X˜)||p˜θ(X˜)
)
(31)
Provided that the spread noise is valid (see section(2)), then
KL
(
p˜θ0(X˜)||p˜θ(X˜)
)
= 0⇒ θ = θ0 (32)
for an identifiable model pθ. Thus
θest = argmax
θ
L˜N (θ) (33)
is a consistent estimator.
This means that (in the large data limit and assuming the training data is generated from the model),
even though we only train on corrupted data, we are optimising an objective L˜N (θ) which has a
global minimum close to that of the objective on uncorrupted data LN (θ). Indeed, the estimator is
consistent in the sense that as the amount of training data increases, we will recover the true clean data
generating mechanism. Hence, provided that the corruption process is based on spread noise, then
we can still learn the model parameters θ even by training on only corrupted data. In our motivating
voting scenario in section(3), we saw explicitly that the estimate θ of the true underlying voting
fraction is consistent and indeed, this is a general property of our approach.
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Figure 1: Training based on the reconstruction approach, section(4.3) for the model with binary
variable p(x = 1) = θ, p(x = 0) = 1 − θ. In each case we plot along the x-axis the true θ0 from
0 to 1 and on the y-axis the value of θ that maximises J∞(θ). In each plot we use a different flip
probability. For a consistent estimator we would require that each plot is a straight x = y line, which
only occurs in the case of no noise, pf = 0.
4.2 TRAINING ON NOISE ONLY
A common approach in private machine learning is to form synthetic (noisy, corrupted) data and then
simply train the standard model on this noisy data — see for example Li et al. (2019). In our notation,
this would be equivalent to maximising the likelihood
L′N (θ) ≡
1
N
N∑
n=1
log pθ(X = x˜n) (34)
As above, assuming that the training data is generated from an underlying model pθ0(Xn = xn), by
the law of large numbers,
lim
N→∞
L′N (θ)
a.s.−−→
∫
x˜
p˜θ0(X˜ = x˜) log pθ(X = x˜) (35)
In general, the optimum of this objective does not occur when θ = θ0 and therefore training on noisy
data alone does not form a consistent estimator of the true underlying model.
We discuss learning with noisy labels more extensively in the context of logistic regression in
section(B) in which we show that provided the label flip noise is not too high p0→1 + p1→0 < 1, and
for zero mean isotropically Gaussian distributed inputs, maximum likelihood training with corrupted
class labels does form a consistent estimator. Hence, whilst one cannot guarantee that maximum
likelihood training of logistic regression on noisy data will result in a consistent estimator, there are
special situations in which this may work.
4.3 RECONSTRUCTION APPROACH
A seemingly natural alternative to our method is to attempt to reconstruct the clean datapoint from
the noisy datapoint and use that within a standard learning framework. This approach would give an
objective
JN (θ) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
∫
xn
p(xn|x˜n) log pθ(xn) (36)
Here we need to define a posterior distribution p(xn|x˜n) to reconstruct the clean datapoint. Since the
learner only has knowledge of the prior pθ(x) it is natural to set
p(xn|x˜n) = pθ(xn|x˜n) ≡ p(x˜n|xn)pθ(xn)∫
xn
p(x˜n|xn)pθ(xn) (37)
By the law of large numbers JN converges to its expectation with respect to the true data generating
mechanism pθ0(x˜) =
∫
p(x˜|x)pθ0(x), so that
lim
N→∞
JN (θ)
a.s.−−→
∫
x,x˜
pθ0(x˜)pθ(x|x˜) log pθ(x) ≡ J∞(θ) (38)
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In general, the optimum of J∞(θ) is not at θ = θ0. To demonstrate this, we plot in figure(1) the
optimal θ for a simple Bernoulli model for which we can calculate J∞(θ) exactly. As we see, for
all but zero flip noise, pf = 0, the estimator does not correctly identify the underlying probabilty
generating mechanism. For this reason, we do not pursue this approach further.
4.4 OTHER DIVERGENCES
An extension of the above is to learn θ by minimising other f -divergences
Df (p˜θ(Y )||pˆ(Y |y)) = Epˆ(Y |y)
[
f
(
p˜θ(Y )
pˆ(Y |y)
)]
(39)
However, this generalisation to any f -divergence is harder to justify since the expectation of this
objective (by averaging over the noise realisations)∫
p˜(y)Df (p˜θ(Y )||pˆ(Y |y)) (40)
will not in general give a divergence between spreaded distributions. This means that in the limit of a
large number of datapoints, it is not guaranteed to recover the true data generating process, except for
special choices of the f -divergence, such as the KL divergence. We leave a discussion of this for
future work.
5 PRIVATE LOGISTIC REGRESSION
As an application of the above framework to a standard machine learning model, we now discuss
how to form a private version of logistic regression.
Returning to our motivating example, users may have labelled face images as “happy" or “sad"
on their mobile phones and the company MugTome wishes to train a “happy/sad" face classifier;
however, users do not wish to send the raw face images to MugTome and also wish to be able to
plausibly deny which label they gave any training image.
In this case we have a set of training data x1, . . . , xN , xn ∈ RD and corresponding binary class
labels c1, . . . , cN , cn ∈ {0, 1}. We wish to fit a logistic regression model
pθ(c|x) = φ((2c− 1)θTcx) (41)
where φ(x) = 1/(1 + e−x) is the logistic function. We follow the general approach outlined in
section(4).
1. The model: For observation (x, c) and parameter θ
pθ(c, x) = pθc(c|x)pθx(x) (42)
where pθc(c|x) is the standard logistic regression model above and pθx(x) is a model of the
input x. The training objective is
LN (θ) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
log pθ(cn, xn) (43)
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
log pθc(cn|xn) +
1
N
N∑
n=1
log pθx(xn) (44)
We note that this is a separable objective for LN (θ) = LcN (θc) + L
x
N (θx), in which the
logistic regression parameters θc are conditionally independent (conditioned on the training
data) of the input parameters θx.
2. Form the corrupted dataset: We wish to send noisy data x˜1, . . . , x˜N , c˜1, . . . , c˜N to the
learner. To do so we need to define a corruption model p(c˜, x˜|c, x). For simplicity, we
consider a corruption model of the form
p(c˜, x˜|c, x) = p(c˜|c)p(x˜|x) (45)
The corruption processes of p(c˜|c) and p(x˜|x) are problem specific; see the experiments
section(6) for some examples.
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3. Send to learner corrupted data and model: The corrupted labels and inputs are sent to
the learner (c˜1, x˜1), . . . , (c˜N , x˜N ) along with the model pθc(c|x), pθx(x) and corruption
process p(c˜|c), p(x˜|x).
4. Learn the model parameters θ: The spread log likelihood is
L˜(θ) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
log p˜θ(c˜n, x˜n) (46)
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
log
∫
xn,cn
p(c˜n|cn)p(x˜n|xn)pθc(cn|xn)pθx(xn) (47)
Unfortunately, in all but special cases, the integral (for continuous x) or sum (for discrete
x) required to evaluate L˜ is not tractable and numerical approximation is required. For this
stage, there are many options available and we present below the approach taken in the
experiments.
Interestingly, we note that, unlike training on clean data, the objective L˜(θ) is not separable
into a function of θc plus a function of θx, meaning that learning the class prediction
parameter θc is coupled with learning the input distribution parameter θx.
5.1 IMPLEMENTATION
In general, the spread noise defines a distribution on a pair of spread variables p(c˜, x˜|c, x) and the
full joint distribution, including the original model is
p(c˜, x˜, c, x) = p(c˜, x˜|c, x)pθc(c|x)pθx(x) (48)
For continuous x, the spread likelihood is then obtained from
p(c˜, x˜) =
∑
c
∫
x
p(c˜, x˜, c, x) (49)
In general, this sum/integral over x is intractable due to the high-dimensionality of x. We use a
standard approach to lower bound the log likelihood (for a single datapoint) by
log p(c˜, x˜) ≥ −Eq(c,x|c˜,x˜) [log q(c, x|c˜, x˜)] + Eq(c,x|c˜,x˜) [log p(c˜, x˜|c, x)pθc(c|x)pθx(x)]
(50)
where q is a distribution chosen to make the bound tight, see for example Barber (2012). This allows
us to use an EM-style procedure in which we iterate between the two steps : (M-step) fix q and
optimise θ and (E-step) fix θ and update q.
1. Iteration k M-step: Update θ to increase the “energy”
θk+1 = argmax
θ
E(θ; qk) (51)
where (for multiple datapoints)
E(θ; q) ≡
N∑
n=1
Eq(cn,xn|c˜n,x˜n) [log pθc(cn|xn)]+
N∑
n=1
Eq(xn|c˜n,x˜n) [log pθx(xn)] (52)
An advantage of this approach is that E(θ; q) is separable and we can update the class
prediction parameter θc independently of the input distribution parameter θx.
In practice we will typically only do a partial optimisation (gradient ascent step) over θ to
guarantee an increase in the energy.
2. Iteration k E-step: The bound is tightest when q is set to the posterior (see for example
Barber (2012)),
qk+1(c, x|c˜, x˜) = p(c, x|c˜, x˜) = p(c˜|c)p(x˜|x)p(c|x)p(x)
Z(c˜, x˜)
(53)
where p(c|x) = pθkc (c|x), p(x) = pθkx(c|x) and the normaliser is given by
Z(c˜, x˜) ≡
∑
c
∫
p(c˜|c)p(x˜|x)p(c|x)p(x)dx (54)
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To implement the M-step, Equation(52) requires expectations of the form∑
c
∫
p(c, x|c˜, x˜)f(x, c)dx (55)
for some function f(x, c). Assuming that the posterior will be reasonably peaked around the noisy
data we use sampling with an importance distribution
ρ(c, x|c˜, x˜) = ρ(c|c˜)ρ(x|x˜) (56)
The expectation is then motivated by∑
c
∫
x
p(c, x|c˜, x˜)f(x, c) =
∑
c
∫
x
ρ(c|c˜)ρ(x|x˜)p(c˜|c)p(x˜|x)p(c|x)p(x)
ρ(c|c˜)ρ(x|x˜)Z(c˜, x˜) f(x, c) (57)
Choosing
ρ(c|c˜) = p(c˜|c)
Zρ(c˜)
, ρ(x|x˜) = p(x˜|x)p(x)
Zρ(x˜)
(58)
for normalising functions Zρ(c˜), Zρ(x˜) we then run a standard importance sampling approximation
(see section(A)). For a given noisy datapoint (c˜n, x˜n) we generate a set of S samples c1n, . . . , c
S
n from
ρ(c|c˜n) and samples x1n, . . . , xSn from ρ(x|x˜n) and compute the importance weights
w(s|n) = φ
(
(2csn − 1)θTcxsn
)∑
s φ ((2c
s
n − 1)θTcxsn)
(59)
The energy equation(52) separates into two independent terms (see section(A))
E(θc; q) ≈
N∑
n=1
S∑
s=1
w(s|n) log φ ((2csn − 1)θTcxsn) (60)
and
E(θx; q) ≈
N∑
n=1
S∑
s=1
w(s|n) log pθx(xsn) (61)
Equation(60) is a weighted version of the standard logistic regression log likelihood, Lc(θc) in
equation(44); similarly equation(61) is a weighted version of Lx(θx). The advantage therefore is that,
given the importance samples, the learning procedure for θ requires only a minor modification of the
standard maximum likelihood training procedure on clean data.
The full procedure is that we randomly initialise θ and then, for each datapoint n, draw samples and
accumulate the gradient across samples and datapoints. After doing a gradient ascent step in θ, we
update the importance distributions and repeat until convergence.
The Importance Sampling approximation is a convenient approach, motivated by the assumption
that corrupted datapoints will be close to their uncorrupted counterparts. Whilst we used a bound
as part of the approximation, this is not equivalent to using a parametric q distribution; by sampling
we form a consistent estimator of the tightest possible lower bound. In other words, we are simply
using Importance Sampling to estimate the expectations required within a standard Expectation
Maximisation algorithm, see for example Barber (2012). We also tried learning a parametric q, similar
to standard variational approaches to log likelihood maximisation, but didn’t find any improvement
on the Importance Sampling approach.
5.2 LEARNING THE PRIOR
If we have access to clean data, the optimal input model pθx(x) can be learned from maximising the
likelihood Lx(θx). However, our general assumption is that we will never have access to clean data.
There may be situations in which the learner has a good model of pθx(x), without compromising
privacy (for example a publicly available dataset for a similar prediction problem might be available)
in which case it makes sense to set the prior to this known model.
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In the absence of a suitable prior we can attempt to learn pθx(x) from the corrupted data by maximising
L˜(θ). For simplicity we assume a factorised model and for a D-dimensional input vector x =
(x[1], . . . , x[D]) write
pθx(x) =
D∏
d=1
p(x[d]|d) (62)
for a collection of learnable univariate distributions p(x[d]|d), d = 1, . . . , D. Under this assumption,
and using the Importance Sampling approach in equation(61), this means that p(x[d]|d) can be
learned by maximising
Ex =
N∑
n=1
S∑
s=1
w(s|n)
D∑
d=1
log p(xns [d]|d) (63)
Since this is a separable objective, we can learn each p(xns [d]|d) independently.
For simplicity, we assume a discrete distribution for x[d] that contains K states (or bins). Then
Ex[d] =
K∑
k=1
N∑
n=1
S∑
s=1
w(s|n)I (xns [d] ∈ k) log p(k|d) (64)
where I (xns [d] ∈ k) is 1 if the sample xns [d] is in the kth state and 0 otherwise. Optimising with
respect to p(k|d) we obtain
p(k|d) =
∑N
n=1
∑S
s=1 w(s|n)I (xns [d] ∈ k)∑K
k=1
∑N
n=1
∑S
s=1 w(s|n)I (xns [d] ∈ k)
(65)
For the M-step of the algorithm we then make a gradient update for θc and update the prior using
equation(65).
6 EXPERIMENTS
We implemented our approach in section(5) to train a logistic regression classifier to distinguish
between the MNIST digits 7 and 9 based on noisy data (250 train and 900 test examples from each
class). We chose to train on a small dataset since this constitutes the most challenging scenario and
helps highlight potential differences between rival approaches. The MNIST images x have pixesl
with 256 states and we used a discrete distribution to model x.
For our experiments we assume a corruption model p(c˜|c) that flips the label 0→ 1 and 1→ 0 with
probability pf with probability pf . We also assume here for simplicity assume a factorised input
corruption model p(x˜|x) = ∏Dd=1 p(x˜[d]|x[d]) in which with probability 1− pf and uniformly from
the other states of that pixel with probability pf .
In this case, computing the Importance Sampling distribution is straightforward since the posterior is
factorised over the image pixels. We considered three settings for the prior (required to compute the
Importance Sampling distribution) : (i) flat prior, (ii) learned prior using EM, (iii) true factorised prior
based on computing the marginal distribution of each pixel on the training dataset. In the ‘true prior’
case we assumed that we know the true marginal distribution of each pixel p(x[d]|d) – in general,
this information would be private, but it is interesting to consider how much improvement is obtained
by knowing this quantity.
We compare the following approaches:
Log Reg Clean Data We trained logistic regression on clean data. This sets an upper limit on the
expected performance.
Log Reg on Noisy Data We trained a standard logistic regression model but using the corrupted
data. This forms a simple baseline comparison.
Spread Log Reg with Learned Prior We used our Spread Likelihood approach to learn the prior.
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
(f) (g) (h) (i) (j)
Figure 2: (a) An example MNIST “7” alongside its noisy examples (b) pf = 0.1, (c) pf = 0.2, (d)
pf = 0.3, (e) pf = 0.4) which is sent to Mugshot.com noise. Each pixel remains in state 1− pf and
is otherwise sampled uniformly from the available states of that pixel. The bottom row shows an
example of a clean “9” (f) and corruptions.
Spread Log with ‘True Prior’ In general our assumption is that the true prior will not be known
(since this requires users to release their private data to the prior learner). However, this
forms an interesting comparison and expected upper bound on the performance of the spread
approach.
Spread Log with Flat Prior In this case we used an informative, flat prior on all pixel states.
We ran 10 experiments for each level of flip noise pf from 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4 and then tested the
prediction accuracy of the learned logistic classifiers on clean hold out data, see figure(3).
For all but small noise levels, the results show the superiority of the spread learning approach over
simply training on noisy data, consistent with our theory that training the standard model on noisy
data does not in general form a consistent estimator. The best performing spread approach is that
which uses the true prior – however, in general this true prior will not be available. For this experiment,
there appears to be little difference between using a flat prior and a learned prior.
The performance of standard logistic regression training but using corrupted data is surprisingly
effective, at least at low noise levels. However the performance degrades quickly for higher noise
levels. A partial explanation for why logistic regression may give good results simply trained on
noisy data is given in section(B).
6.1 GAUSSIAN INPUT PRIOR p(x)
We also demonstrate here training logistic regression treating the pixels as continuous. If we an
independent have (per pixel) a Gaussian prior
p(xi) = N
(
xi µi, σ¯
2
i
)
(66)
and independent Gaussian spread noise
p(x˜i|xi) = N
(
x˜i xi, σ
2
i
)
(67)
then using the Importance Sampling posterior is
ρ(xi|x˜i) = N
(
xi mean =
bi
ai
, var =
1
ai
)
(68)
where
ai =
1
σ2i
+
1
σ¯2i
, bi =
x˜i
σ2i
+
µi
σ¯2i
(69)
We also used Gaussian spread noise to corrupt the images and train a binary classifier to distinguish
between the MNIST digits 7 and 9 based on noisy data (4500 train and 900 test examples from
each class). For simplicity, we assumed factorised distributions with prior p(xi) = N
(
xi µi, σ¯
2
i
)
,
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Figure 3: The test accuracy (on clean data) of the trained logistic regression models, averaged over 10
different randomly chosen training datasets of 500 datapoints. The x-axis is the corruption probability
pf . “log reg”: Standard logistic regression training on clean data; “SD true prior”: spread divergence
training approach with true prior; “SD learn prior”: spread approach with learned prior; “SD flat
prior”: spread approach with flat prior; “log reg noise”: standard logistic regression training but
trained on noisy data.
p(x˜i|xi) = N
(
x˜i xi, σ
2
i
)
. We chose spread flip noise pf = 0.2 for the class labels and uniform
spread noise with variance σ2i = 0.1; the prior p(x) was set to be quite uninformative with mean
µi = 0 and variance σ¯2i = 10. This level of noise means that approximately 20% of the class labels
are incorrect in the data passed to MugTome and the associated image is significantly blurred, see
figure(4). For standard logistic regression we found that for a learning rate of 0.2, 400 iterations gave
the best performance, with 95.5% train accuracy and 95.7% test accuracy. Using our Importance
Sampling scheme with S = 2 samples per noisy datapoint, the trained θ when tested on clean images
had 94.4% test accuracy. This shows that despite the high level of class label and image noise,
MugTome are able to learn an effective classifier, preserving the privacy of the users. The loss in test
and training accuracy, despite this high noise level is around a modest 1%. When using higher spread
noise with variance σ2 = 0.5, the θ learned on the noisy data had a clean data test accuracy 93%,
which is also a modest decrease in accuracy for a significant increase in privacy.
For future work it would be interesting to consider other forms of noise, for example downsampling
images. However, downsampling does not form an injective mapping and as such we cannot guarantee
that we can find a consistent estimator for the underlying model.
7 DISCUSSION
There are many forms of private machine learning. Some attempt to transform a datapoint x to a form
x′ such that a protected attribute a (such as gender) cannot be recovered from x′, yet the prediction
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Figure 4: (a) An example MNIST “7” alongside its noisy example which is sent to MugTome with
Gaussian noise variance (b) σ2 = 0.1 and (c) σ2 = 0.5 ; (d,e,f) similarly for an MNIST “9”.
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of an output y (for example using p(y|x′)) is retained. For example this could be achieved by using a
loss function such as (see for example Li et al. (2019))
L(θ, φ, ψ) =
∑
n
[Ly(yn, y(x
′
n; θ))− La(an, a(x′n;φ))] (70)
where n is the data index, y(x′; θ) is a function that takes input x′ and outputs a prediction y; a(x′;φ)
is a function that takes input x′ and outputs an attribute prediction a and x′ = f(x;ψ) gives a
representation of the input; Ly, La are loss functions. In this protected attribute setting, typically
some form of the clean dataset is required to learn the parameters θ, φ, ψ.
Another common form of private machine learning is based on differential privacy (Dwork & Roth,
2014), with the aim to make it difficult to discern whether a datapoint xn was used to train the
predictor y(x; θ). That is, given a trained model, differential privacy attempts to restrict the ability to
differentiate whether any individual’s datum was used to train the model.
A closely related concept to randomised response is that of plausible deniability, namely privately
corrupting a datapoint xn such that no-one (except the datapoint provider) can confidently state what
the original (private) value of xn is. Recently Bindschaedler et al. (2017) used this to create synthetic
datapoints, which were subsequently used with a standard machine learning training approach. The
authors showed that generating synthetic data x˜ from a distribution p(x˜|x) that takes dependency
amongst the elements of the vector x results in better machine learning predictors than sampling
from a factorised distribution. In synthetic data generation approaches the assumption is that the
statistical characteristics are similar to the real data. However, care is required since if the generating
mechanism is powerful, it may generate data which is very similar to the private data.
In general these synthetic data generating approaches do not take into consideration when learning the
parameters of the machine learning model what that synthetic data generation mechanism is. This is
analogous to simply using the corrupted votes to directly estimate the fraction of voters that voted for
a candidate, equation(1), rather than using knowledge of the data generation approach, equation(2).
8 SUMMARY
We discussed a general privacy preserving mechanism based on random response in a datapoint is
replaced by a corrupted versions. We showed that, provided the corruption process is a valid spread
noise, then a maximum likelihood approach forms a consistent estimator. That is, even though the
model is only trained on corrupted, synthetic data, it is possible to recover the true underlying data
genering mechnanism on the clean data. We applied this approach to a simple logistic regression
model, showing that the approach can work well, even with high levels of noise. The approach is
readily applicable to a large class of much more complex models and other divergences.
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A PRIVACY PRESERVING LOGISTIC REGRESSION
The posterior is given by
p(c, x|c˜, x˜) = p(c˜|c)p(x˜|x)p(c|x)p(x)∑
c
∫
x
p(c˜|c)p(x˜|x)p(c|x)p(x) =
p(c˜|c)p(x˜|x)p(c|x)p(x)
Z(c˜, x˜)
(71)
For the learning, we need to take expectations∑
c
∫
x
p(c, x|c˜, x˜)f(x, c)s (72)
We use importance sampling to approximate this expectation∑
c
∫
x
p(c, x|c˜, x˜)f(x, c) =
∑
c
∫
x
ρ(c|c˜)ρ(x|x˜) p(c, x|c˜, x˜)
ρ(c|c˜)ρ(x|x˜)f(x, c) (73)
=
∑
c
∫
x
ρ(c|c˜)ρ(x|x˜)p(c˜|c)p(x˜|x)p(c|x)p(x)
ρ(c|c˜)ρ(x|x˜)Z(c˜, x˜) f(x, c) (74)
Choosing
ρ(c|c˜) = p(c˜|c)∑
c p(c˜|c)
=
p(c˜|c)
Zρ(c˜)
, ρ(x|x˜) = p(x˜|x)p(x)∫
x
p(x˜|x)p(x) =
p(x˜|x)p(x)
Zρ(x˜)
(75)
we have ∑
c
∫
x
p(c, x|c˜, x˜)f(x, c) = Zρ(c˜)Zρ(x˜)
∑
c
∫
x
ρ(c|c˜)ρ(x|x˜) p(c|x)
Z(c˜, x˜)
f(x, c) (76)
Here
Z(c˜, x˜) =
∑
c
∫
x
ρ(c|c˜)ρ(x|x˜)p(c˜|c)p(x˜|x)p(c|x)p(x)
ρ(c|c˜)ρ(x|x˜) (77)
=
∑
c
∫
x
ρ(c|c˜)ρ(x|x˜)p(c˜|c)p(x˜|x)p(c|x)p(x)
ρ(c|c˜)ρ(x|x˜) (78)
= Zρ(c˜)Zρ(x˜)
∑
c
∫
x
ρ(c|c˜)ρ(x|x˜)p(c|x) (79)
Putting this together and using the same samples to estimate the numerator and denominator expecta-
tions, ∑
c
∫
x
p(c, x|c˜, x˜)f(x, c) =
∑
c
∫
x
ρ(c|c˜)ρ(x|x˜) p(c|x)∑
c
∫
x
ρ(c|c˜)ρ(x˜|x)p(c|x)f(x, c) (80)
≈
∑
s
p(cs|xs)∑
s p(c
s|xs)f(x
s, cs) (81)
=
∑
s
w(s)f(xs, cs) (82)
for importance weight
w(s) =
p(cs|xs)∑
s p(c
s|xs) (83)
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For the logistic regression case, we have
f(x, c) = log p(c|x) = log φ ((2c− 1)θTx) (84)
where φ(x) = 1/(1 + exp(−x)).
The variational lower bound then becomes
N∑
n=1
S∑
s=1
w(s|n) log φ ((2csn − 1)θTxsn) (85)
where, for a given noisy datapoint c˜n, x˜n we generate a set of S samples c1n, . . . , c
S
n from ρ(c|c˜n)
and samples x1n, . . . , x
S
n from ρ(x|x˜n)
w(s|n) = φ
(
(2csn − 1)θTxsn
)∑
s φ ((2c
s
n − 1)θTxsn)
(86)
B TRAINING ON NOISY DATA
A common approach in private machine learning is to train the standard model based on noisy alone,
corresponding to maximising L′N (θ), equation(35). As we discussed, this does not in general give a
consistent estimator of the true underlying model. To show this, we consider a logistic regression
in which only the class labels c are corrupted with probabilities p0→1 ≡ p(c˜ = 1|c = 0) and in the
same state with p1→1 ≡ p(c˜ = 1|c = 1), leaving the inputs x uncorrupted. In this case
L′N (θ) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
I (c˜n = 1) log φ
(
θTcxn
)
+ I (c˜n = 0) log
(
1− φ(θTcxn)
)
(87)
If we assume that the true labels are drawn from an underlying model
p(c = 1|x) = φ (θT0x) (88)
then the probability of a corrupted label is given by
p(c˜ = 1|x) = p1→1φ
(
θT0x
)
+ p0→1
(
1− φ (θT0x)) (89)
and by the law of large numbers, L′N tends to
L′∞(θ) ≡ Ep(x)
[
p(c˜ = 1|x) log φ(θTcx) + (1− p(c˜ = 1|x)) log
(
1− φ(θTcx))
)]
(90)
Taking the gradient wrt θc, we obtain
gθ = Ep(x)
[(
p(c˜ = 1|x)(1− φ(θTcx))x− (1− p(c˜ = 1|x))φ(θTcx)
)
x
]
(91)
A sufficient condition for the gradient to be zero is
p(c˜ = 1|x)(1− φ(θTcx)) = (1− p(c˜ = 1|x))φ(θTcx) (92)
That is
p(c˜ = 1|x) = φ(θTcx) (93)
which is
p1→1φ
(
θT0x
)
+ p0→1
(
1− φ (θT0x)) = φ(θTcx) (94)
In general, equation(94) does not have a solution at θc = θ0.
To understand when the objective equation(90) has an optimum, we assume the data is drawn from
p(x) = N (x µ,Σ), then, defining
z1 = θ
T
0x, z2 = θ
T
cx (95)
Since x is Gaussian distributed, z is also Gaussian distributed with
E [z1] = θT0µ, E [z2] = θTµ (96)
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E [z1z2]− E [z1]E [z2] = θTΣθ0 (97)
E
[
z21
]− E [z1]2 = θT0Σθ0 (98)
E
[
z22
]− E [z2]2 = θTΣθ (99)
We can then write the large data limit log likelihood as a two dimensional expectation
L′∞(θ) = E [(p1→1φ(z1) + p0→1(1− φ(z1))) log φ(z2)]
+ E [1− p1→1φ(z1)− p0→1(1− φ(z1))) log (1− φ(z2)))] (100)
For simplicity, consider µ = 0, Σ = s2I , θT0θ0 = 1, θ
Tθ = 1, θT0θ = cos(α). It is straightforward
to show that in this case the gradient with respect to α is zero when α = 0, namely when θ = θ0.
However, in general, for non-isotropic data covariance Σ, the gradient is non-zero at θ = θ0.
To derive the above result, we note that the covariance for z in this case is simply
C ≡ s2
[
1 cosα
cosα 1
]
(101)
We now use the decomposition C = MMT, with Cholesky factor
M = s
[
1 0
cosα sinα
]
(102)
Then drawing a sample from z is equivalent to z ∼M for  ∼ N ( 0, I). Defining
γ(x) = p1→1φ(x) + p0→1(1− φ(x)) (103)
we can then write the expected log likelihood as a function of φ:
L′∞(α) = EN ( 0,I) [γ(Z1(1)) log φ(Z2(1, 2)) + (1− γ(Z1(1))) log (1− φ(Z2(1, 2)))]
(104)
where the functions are defined as
Z1(1) = s1, Z2(1, 2) = s (1 cosα+ 2 sinα) (105)
Differentiating L′∞(α) with respect to α, we obtain
sEN ( 0,I) [(γ(Z1(1))− φ(Z2(1, 2))) (2 cosα− 1 sinα)] (106)
When α = 0 we note that Z2(1, 2) is independent of 2 and that the above is therefore is zero.
Hence L˜′∞(α) has zero gradient at α = 0.
It is straightforward to show that the second derivative of L′∞(α) (evaluated at α = 0) is
sEN (1 0,1) [−1γ(s1)]− s2EN (1 0,1) [φ(s1)(1− φ(s1))] (107)
The second term in equation(107) above is clearly negative. Using integration by parts (and noting
that we may assume s > 0), one may easily show that the first term is also negative provided that
p1→1 > p0→1.
Hence we arrive at the (perhaps surprising) result that for zero mean isotropic Gaussian distributed
input data, training on noisy data (c˜, x) in which the class labels have been flipped with some
probability, results in a consistent estimator for θ0, provided the flip noise is not too high, namely
p1→1 > p0→1, or equivalently, p0→1 + p1→0 < 1. This result holds even in the case of asymmetric
flip noise p0→1 6= p1→0.
More generally, even if the data p(x) is not Gaussian distributed, from the Central Limit Theorem,
p(z) is likely to be close to Gaussian distributed for high dimensional inputs. Hence, for input data x
that is roughly isotropically distributed, we can expect that training using maximum likelihood for
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any classifier of the form p(c = 1|x) = φ (θTx) will likely be close to recovering the true θ0 that
generated the data (in the limit of a large number of datapoints).
The above analysis considered only noise on the class label. If, independently of the class label we
add isotropic Gaussian noise to the observations, then the projection z will still be isotropic Gaussian
distributed for Gaussian inputs p(x) and the above argument trivially extends to this case as well.
Hence, one can expect training (using standard logistic regression but with corrupted inputs and
flipped labels) to be partially successful at recovering the true data generating process provided that
the input data is close to isotropically distributed, motivating a whitening pre-processing step of the
input data.
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